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REQUIEM FOR A REMEDY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL v. BARTLETT’S  
OVER-PREEMPTION 
ROBERT C. BAKER III∗ 
In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,1 the Supreme Court of the 
United States considered whether generic pharmaceutical manufacturers 
could be held strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous, defective drug de-
signs2 when Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations prohibited 
the redesign of generic drugs.3  Extending the Court’s impossibility 
preemption in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,4 the Court preempted New Hamp-
shire’s “warning-based design-defect cause[s] of action” because generic 
manufacturers were unable to cure the defective design under federal law; 
dual compliance was “impossible.”5  In so holding, the Court rejected the 
compensatory focus of the First Circuit6 and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in 
favor of negligence-based, deterrence-centric tort policy.7  As a result, the 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 2.  Strict products liability is predominantly derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A with a minority of states adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.  
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 246 (3d ed. 2015); see also AMERICAN LAW OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 28.1 (John D. Hodson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).  New Hampshire adopted 
the Restatement Second approach.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473. 
 3.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (restricting generic manufac-
turer autonomy). 
 4.  131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011) (preempting failure to warn claims because dual com-
pliance with federal law mandating the existing labeling and state law requiring stronger labeling 
was impossible). 
 5.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477–78. 
 6.  Id. (rejecting the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” in which a manufacturer could 
avoid liability by exiting the market). 
 7.  See infra Part IV.A.  Deterrence and compensation are conflicting functions of tort law.  
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27–29, 37 
(1970).  Deterrence is best achieved by negligence-based liability; compensation is best ensured 
by strict liability.  See DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 205–06 
(1996) (identifying optimal tort schemes for varied goals).  The Supreme Court has not consistent-
ly decided which tort function takes precedence. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 471 (2008) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court’s alternating conception of tort-as-regulation versus tort-as-compensation . . . falls 
short as a normative prescription for cases yet to be decided . . . [and] begs the institutional ques-
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manufacturers of eighty percent of the drug prescriptions dispensed in the 
United States8 are immune from most products liability while a victim’s 
ability to recover hangs on a pharmacist’s whim.9 
While correctly decided under New Hampshire’s negligence-based 
“strict”10 products liability, expansive application of Bartlett in other juris-
dictions has led to over-simplistic preemption of long-established tort 
schemes.11  To protect traditional conceptions of fault12 from the dissent’s 
reformist law and economic policy, the Bartlett Court employed deterrence-
centric reasoning to cast compensatory tort policy into a straw man of abso-
lute liability.13  The resulting anti-compensatory holding invited subsequent 
courts’ preemption of distinguishable tort regimes.14  The Court, instead, 
should have curtailed its rejection of compensatory tort policy in deference 
to states that have adopted “stricter”15 products liability under modern prin-
ciples of federalism.16  Though inapplicable to New Hampshire, the com-
pensatory law and economic policy of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent lends le-
gitimacy to states’ decisions to maintain “stricter” liability regimes.17 
                                                          
tion of who should decide the critical regulatory policy issues at the heart of the . . . preemption 
inquiry.”). 
 8.  IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF 2011 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%
20Informatics/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf) (“generics . . . represent[] 80% of dis-
pensed prescriptions”). 
 9.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67988 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0001 (“access to the courts 
is dependent on whether an individual is dispensed a brand name or generic drug”); see infra Parts 
II.C, III (discussing preemption of all products liability except manufacturing defects).  
 10.  Traditional strict liability was distinguishable from negligence.  See infra Part II.C and 
text accompanying note 157. 
 11.  E.g., Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting 
Maryland’s consumer expectations approach without state-specific analysis).  The consumer ex-
pectations approach is older and traditionally “stricter” than modern approaches.  See infra Part 
IV.C. 
 12.  See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 395 A.2d 843, 845–46 (discussing New Hamp-
shire’s fault system).  Fault is a vehicle of deterrence, not compensation.  See Guido Calabresi, 
Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 750 (2005). 
 13.  See infra Part IV.A.  Law and economics not only “seeks to explain the law, or the legal 
system, as it is,” it provides an avenue for normative analysis to describe how the law should be.  
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (8th ed. 2011); Keith N. Hylton, Cala-
bresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 91 (2005). 
 14.  See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C. 
 15.  Perhaps when states first adopted strict products liability it was truly “strict,” meaning 
that courts did not use negligence principles in their analyses, but strict product liability doctrine 
has drifted towards negligence as state common law diverged.  See infra Part IV.C, note 157 and 
accompanying text. Thus negligence, strict liability, and absolute liability are best thought of on a 
spectrum rather than as distinct doctrines with the term “stricter” reflecting the degree of drift.  
 16.  See infra Part IV.A (discussing federalism). 
 17.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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In response to the Court’s expansive generic pharmaceutical preemp-
tion, the FDA proposed a rule that undermines the impossibility preemption 
reasoning of PLIVA and Bartlett.18  Specifically, the rule would permit ge-
neric manufacturers to unilaterally change their labeling like their brand-
name counterparts.19  Though the rulemaking would render Bartlett moot, 
analysis of the law and economic ideologies shaping the Court’s deci-
sionmaking is instructive for predicting the Court’s future preemption of 
tort law.20 
I.  THE CASE 
Shortly after beginning a regimen of prescription sulindac,21 Karen 
Bartlett experienced a severe cutaneous hypersensitivity reaction that pre-
sented as burn-like wounds on sixty-five percent of her body.22  Ms. Bartlett 
was hospitalized for seventy days, much of which she spent in a medically 
induced coma.23  She suffered permanent esophageal, vaginal, and pulmo-
nary injuries that prevent normal eating, sexual relations, and aerobic activi-
ty; she also suffers from near-blindness and severe disfigurement.24  Ms. 
Bartlett’s condition necessitated several surgeries and cost millions of dol-
lars in medical expenses.25 
At the time of Ms. Bartlett’s injury, sulindac carried a general warning 
against “severe skin reactions” and was a known cause of her condition, 
                                                          
 18.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-
logical Products; Public Meeting; Request for Comments; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80 
Fed. Reg. 8577 (February 11, 2015), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0081; see also 
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological 
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989, 67995 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0001. 
 19.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67989.  
 20.  See infra Parts IV.A, IV.D. 
 21.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010) aff’d, 678 F.3d 30 
(1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).  Sulindac is a generic, anti-inflammatory pain re-
liever manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceuticals.  Id. 
 22.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 
(2013).  Ms. Bartlett developed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and later toxic epidermal necrosis 
(SJS/TEN), which is characterized by a severe burn-like rash causing dermal separation.  Id.; 
Robert A. Schwartz et al., Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis: Part I. Introduction, History, Classifica-
tion, Clinical Features, Systemic Manifestations, Etiology, and Immunopathogenesis, 69 J. AM. 
ACAD. DERMATOL. 173.e1, 173.e2 (2013). 
 23.  Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34, 43. 
 24.  Id. at 43. 
 25.  Id. (noting that Bartlett has had twelve surgeries on her eyes alone with more anticipat-
ed); Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 (D.N.H. 2011) aff’d, 678 F.3d 30 (1st 
Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (delineating compensatory damages for medical expenses 
as approximately $3.5 million). 
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Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrosis (“SJS/TEN”).26  
In fact, one of the preeminent SJS/TEN epidemiological studies available at 
the time specifically implicated sulindac as associated with more reported 
cases of SJS/TEN than any other pharmaceutical in its drug class.27  Partial-
ly because of this study, the FDA later strengthened sulindac’s labeling to 
explicitly warn against SJS/TEN.28 
Ms. Bartlett brought suit under New Hampshire law advancing numer-
ous tort theories, though only one survived summary judgment: she alleged 
that the manufacturer was strictly liable for marketing an “unreasonably 
dangerous” product.29  Importantly, Ms. Bartlett’s failure-to-warn claims 
failed on case-specific grounds because Ms. Bartlett’s prescribing physician 
never reviewed sulindac’s label.30  After a three-week trial, the jury found 
Mutual Pharmaceutical strictly liable for a design defect and awarded Ms. 
Bartlett twenty-one million dollars in damages.31  In response, Mutual 
Pharmaceutical renewed its motion for judgment alleging that Ms. Bartlett’s 
design defect claims were preempted by federal regulations prohibiting a 
manufacturer from redesigning generic sulindac.32 
The district court denied Mutual Pharmaceutical’s motion and con-
cluded, “[f]ederal law did not require Mutual to sell sulindac.  Nor, for that 
matter, did state law require Mutual to stop selling it, or to redesign it.”33  
Instead, state law created liability for selling a product with greater risks 
than benefits.34  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, reason-
ing that Mutual Pharmaceutical could avoid liability by choosing to stop 
                                                          
 26.  Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34; Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
 27.  Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (citing Maja Mockenhaupt et al., The Risk of SJS and 
TEN Associated with NSAIDs: A Multinational Perspective, 30 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 2234 (2003)). 
 28.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013) (explaining that a class warn-
ing of SJS/TEN was added to all prescription NSAID labeling). 
 29.  Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 143.  Bartlett initially brought suit in New Hampshire Superi-
or Court but the case was removed by Mutual Pharmaceutical.  Id.  Bartlett originally brought 
claims for breach of warranty, negligence, gross negligence, and fraud.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. 
Co., 08-CV-00358-JL, 2010 WL 3659789, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 14, 2010) (granting summary 
judgment); Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 143 n.3, 151. 
 30.  Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 146.  At his deposition, Bartlett’s prescribing physician testi-
fied that he never reviewed nor was influenced in any way by sulindac’s labeling so specific cau-
sation could not be established.  Id. 
 31.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2011) aff’d, 678 F.3d 
30 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (“$21.06 million in damages, consisting of . . . 
$16.5 million for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life”).  The jury concluded that su-
lindac’s risks outweighed its benefits making it a defective product unreasonably dangerous to 
consumers.  Id. at 227. 
 32.  Id. at 227, 247–48. 
 33.  Id. at 248 (emphasis added). 
 34.  Id.  The court cites an underlying order stating: “strict products liability requires . . . that 
manufacturers compensate consumers for the damage caused by unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts, not necessarily that they remove such products from the market.”  Id. (quoting Bartlett v. 
Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 08-CV-358-JL, 2010 WL 3092649, at *8 (D.N.H. Aug. 2, 2010)). 
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selling the drug.35  The court noted, however, that a “developing split in [the 
preemption jurisprudence of] the lower courts” required decisive resolution 
by the Supreme Court.36  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether federal law preempts New Hampshire’s design defect cause of ac-
tion.37 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In PLIVA v. Mensing, the Supreme Court preempted strict products li-
ability when generic pharmaceutical manufacturers could not comply with 
both the common law and the FDA’s restrictive regulatory framework.  The 
PLIVA Court, however, did not address the First Circuit’s stop-selling ra-
tionale.  Part II.A of this Note discusses the regulatory framework govern-
ing generic pharmaceuticals.  Part II.B outlines the development and current 
trends in design-defect strict products liability.  Part II.C examines the 
Court’s rejection of impossibility preemption for brand-name pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers in Wyeth v. Levine38 and its apparent reversal for generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in PLIVA v. Mensing. 
A.  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enacted a Rigid Approval 
Process for Generic Pharmaceuticals That Requires Complete 
Duplication of the Branded Drug 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)39 requires pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers to gain approval from the FDA prior to marketing a 
drug.40  Under the FDCA, New Drug Applications (“NDA”) may only be 
approved after rigorous FDA vetting, including comprehensive clinical test-
ing, labeling, pharmacovigilance, and risk-benefit analyses.41  To foster 
competition in the pharmaceutical market, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the “Hatch-
                                                          
 35.  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37–38, 44 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 
(2013). 
 36.  Id. at 38, 44. 
 37.  Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470, 2472 (2013) (citing Mut. Pharm. Co. 
v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012)). 
 38.  555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 39.  21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012). 
 40.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (requiring approval from the FDA for all drugs introduced in 
to interstate commerce). 
 41.  Id. §§ 355(b)(1)(A), 355(b)(1)(F), 355(d); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2)(i), 314.50(c)(2)(ix), 
314.50(d)(2), 314.50(d)(5)(iv), 314.50(d)(5)(viii)(2014).  Mirroring a risk-utility test, the FDA 
only considers a drug safe when the “probable therapeutic benefits . . . outweigh [the] risk of 
harm.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000).  An NDA is a 
costly, multi-year iterative process culminating in a multi-thousand page application.  See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT 6–8 (2006), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-49/content-detail.html; see also Bart-
lett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471. 
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Waxman Act,”42 created an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) 
to expedite approval of generic versions of approved, brand-name, NDAs.43  
Under the ANDA framework, a generic pharmaceutical may be approved 
without the same level of testing as long as it is identical to the NDA refer-
ence drug.44 
While the Hatch-Waxman Act sets out in detail the ANDA approval 
process, it is silent regarding post-approval pharmacovigilance or other 
maintenance.45  Instead, the Act includes an enabling clause in which the 
FDA “shall promulgate . . . such regulations as may be necessary for the 
administration of [the Act].”46  Subsequent FDA regulations curbed ANDA 
manufacturer autonomy and warned that approval may be withdrawn if 
ANDA labeling deviates from the reference NDA.47  FDA regulations re-
quire pre-approval for all “major” NDA changes with only narrow express 
exceptions.48  One such exception, commonly known as the changes-being-
effected (“CBE”) provision, allows manufacturers to unilaterally strengthen 
labeling to reflect newly acquired safety information.49  The FDA also re-
quires ongoing pharmacovigilance and periodic reporting for both NDA and 
ANDA applications.50 
B.  The “Unreasonably Dangerous” Standard of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Has Developed into Two Distinct Tests to 
Calculate Strict Products Liability 
Modern strict products liability is derived from the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts Section 402A providing that: “[o]ne who sells any product in 
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is 
                                                          
 42.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).  
 43.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j); H.R. REP. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
 44.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).  For purposes of the statute, identical means chemically equiv-
alent, id. § 355(j)(2)(A), bioequivalent in rate of absorption, id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), and labeling-
equivalent, id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).  Any variations, however, trigger additional testing.  Id. 
§ 355(j)(2)(C).  The regulations refer to the reference listed drug (“RLD”) not the NDA drug be-
cause competitively marketed pharmaceuticals may have multiple NDAs.  21 C.F.R. § 314.3 
(2014) (defining “Reference listed drug”); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS x–xi (35th ed. 2014), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2015) (discussing RLDs). 
 45.  See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (limiting discussion to the initial application process). 
 46.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act § 105(a).  
 47.  21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2014).  The regulation excepts deviations that are explicitly 
permitted.  Id. 
 48.  Id. § 314.70(b)–(d) (outlining “major,” “moderate,” and “minor” changes). 
 49.  Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568–69 (2009) (analyzing 
the provision). 
 50.  21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80–314.81. 
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subject to liability.”51  To identify “unreasonably dangerous” “defective 
condition[s],” two distinct tests emerged: the consumer expectations test 
and the risk-utility test.52  The consumer expectations test developed from 
comments g and i of Section 402A.53  The test defined an unreasonably 
dangerous defective condition as “dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer . . . with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community.”54  The risk-utility balancing test 
instead adopted a manufacturer-oriented approach; common considerations 
include: the usefulness and benefit of the product; the likelihood and severi-
ty of danger; and the feasibility, availability, and reasonableness of preven-
tative measures or an alternative design.55 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability officially adopts 
factors of the risk-utility test, including concepts of reasonableness, fore-
seeability, negligence, and reasonable alternative design.56  These factors 
translate into a restrictive negligence framework diametrically opposed to a 
consumer expectations approach.57  For example, under the Restatement 
Third, a drug is only defective if a health care provider “would not prescribe 
the drug . . . for any class of patients.”58 As of yet, the Restatement Third 
remains only sparsely followed among the states.59 
C.  Juxtaposing Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA v. Mensing, 
Pharmaceutical Tort Liability Turns upon Impossibility Preemption 
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court chose not to apply impossibility preemp-
tion to failure-to-warn tort liability against brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.60  The Court reasoned that the CBE provision of 21 C.F.R. 
                                                          
 51.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 52.  E.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013) (applying New Hamp-
shire’s risk-utility test); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343–53, 363 A.2d 955, 958–
63 (1976) (adopting a consumer expectations approach). 
 53.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g & i (1965). 
 54.  Id. at cmt. i. 
 55.  See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (outlining risk-utility test); see also Vautour v. 
Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001) (“[W]hile proof of an alterna-
tive design is relevant in a design defect case, it should be neither a controlling factor nor an es-
sential element that must be proved in every case.”). 
 56.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998); see id. cmt. a 
(“[s]ubsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or 
sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve the same 
general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence”). 
 57.  Compare id. § 6(c) (restricting liability), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A cmt. i (1965) (conditioning liability on ordinary consumer expectations).  
 58.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998). 
 59.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 60.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).  Wyeth arose out of defective labeling of an 
intravenous (IV) antihistamine used to treat nausea.  Id. at 559–60.  At the time of injury, the drug 
labeling permitted two methods of administration: (1) via a shot directly into a patient’s vein, or 
  
88 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:81 
314.70(c)(6)—that allowed pharmaceutical companies to unilaterally 
change their labels without FDA pre-approval—foreclosed impossibility 
preemption.61  The Court further refused to recognize federal objective 
preemption by the FDA approval process.62  The Court reasoned that if 
Congress believed state lawsuits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it 
would have enacted express preemption as it had for medical devices.63  
The Court noted that, traditionally, state tort claims were considered com-
plementary to FDA regulation: serving to supplement the FDA’s limited re-
sources by incentivizing manufacturers with “superior access” to post-
market data to identify new risks.64  Under this approach, FDA approval 
serves as a floor for safety, not a ceiling.65 
Justice Thomas concurred in judgment expressing a strong distaste for 
what he termed “implied pre-emption doctrines.”66  Justice Thomas instead 
favored narrower impossibility preemption.67  Arguing federal objective 
preemption, Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Scalia, proposed that “the real issue is whether a state tort jury can 
countermand the FDA’s considered judgment” that a warning renders a 
drug safe.68  Justice Alito found juries “ill equipped to perform the FDA’s 
cost-benefit-balancing function.”69 
                                                          
(2) by first inserting an IV-drip and then administering through the drip.  Id. at 559.  The drug la-
beling warned that the medication would cause irreversible damage if it escaped the vein; the IV-
drip method ameliorated this risk.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that the labeling should have fore-
closed the direct “shot” method as unreasonably dangerous.  Id. at 560. 
 61.  Id. at 570–73.  Wyeth argued the CBE provision was only implicated when new infor-
mation was acquired and furthermore that the CBE provision conflicts with the misbranding regu-
lations.  Id. at 568–70.  The Court did not adopted this “cramped reading of the CBE regulation.”  
Id. at 570–72. 
 62.  Id. at 573–75, 581. 
 63.  Id. at 574–75.  “Congress could have applied the pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA.  
It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause that applies only to medical devices.”  Id. 
(quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64.  Id. at 578–79 (“[T]he FDA long maintained that state law offers an additional, and im-
portant, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation.”). 
 65.  See id. at 573–74, 578–79 (discussing purpose of regulation). 
 66.  Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“In particular, I have become increasing-
ly skeptical of this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence. . . .  [I]mplied 
pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion . . . .”). 
 67.  Id. at 589–90, 593–94.  Justice Thomas expressed a novel twist on impossibility preemp-
tion that would foreshadow his opinions in PLIVA and Mutual.  See id. at 590 (questioning the 
“physical impossibility” standard and noting that a “logical-contradiction” standard may prove 
more apt (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260–61 (2000)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 68.  Id. at 605 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 69.  Id. at 626. 
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In PLIVA v. Mensing,70 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held 
that state failure-to-warn claims against generic pharmaceutical manufac-
turers were in impossible conflict with federal law, precluding manufactur-
ers from controlling their labeling.71  The PLIVA Court explained that the 
state tort law requires manufacturers who are aware, or should be aware, of 
a “product’s danger to label that product in a way that renders it reasonably 
safe.”72  Federal law, however, requires generic pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to adopt labeling identical to the branded version of the drug.73  The 
plaintiffs argued that generic manufacturers could have unilaterally changed 
their labels via the CBE provision or issued “Dear Doctor” letters to inform 
prescribing physicians of the danger.74  The FDA, under Auer75 deference, 
rejected both contentions, and instead asserted that federal law created a 
manufacturer duty to propose stronger labels to the FDA if the manufactur-
ers believed they were warranted.76  The Court, however, held that the 
proper question for impossibility analysis “is whether the private party 
could independently do under federal law what state law requires of it,” not 
whether the party could possibly influence a consistent result.77  Since the 
generic manufacturer could not independently change the labeling under 
federal law, the state claims were preempted, creating an “unfortunate” dis-
parity between brand and generic tort liability.78 
                                                          
 70.  131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).  The controversy in PLIVA, arose from the discovery that Reglan, 
a drug to aid digestion, was found to be causally related to tardive dyskinesia, a neurological dis-
order, in patients engaging in long-term therapy (incidence of twenty-nine percent).  Id. at 2572.  
The plaintiffs developed the condition before the FDA strengthened the warning labeling and sued 
the generic manufacturer for failure to warn in the face of “mounting evidence.”  Id. at 2572–73 
(quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009)).   
 71.  Id. at 2580–81. 
 72.  Id. at 2573. 
 73.  Id. at 2574 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v), 355(j)(4)(G), 314.94(a)(8), 
314.127(a)(7) (2014)). 
 74.  Id. at 2575–76.  “Dear Doctor” letters contain direct warnings sent to healthcare profes-
sionals.  Id. at 2576. 
 75.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  Under Auer, the FDA is granted deference in its 
interpretation of its own regulations unless “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.’”  Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 
(1989)). 
 76.  PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–77.  The FDA interpreted the misbranding provision of 21 
U.S.C. § 314.150(b)(10) (2012)—withdrawing ANDA approval for deviating from the brand la-
beling—to foreclose changes via the CBE provision or the proposed “Dear Doctor” letters.  
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–76.  The FDA sought to undermine preemption by interpreting the 
misbranding provision to impose a duty to notify the FDA of potential product dangers.  Id. at 
2576–77.  The Court, however, found preemption regardless of this duty.  Id. at 2577–78 (finding 
an additional duty did not resolve impossibility). 
 77.  PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579.   
 78.  Id. at 2581 (“We recognize that . . . finding pre-emption here but not in Wyeth makes lit-
tle sense.  Had [plaintiffs] taken . . . the brand-name . . . their lawsuits would not be pre-empted.  
But because pharmacists . . . substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law pre-empts 
  
90 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:81 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court reversed 
the First Circuit79 and, extending PLIVA v. Mensing,80 preempted “warning-
based design-defect causes of action” against generic drug manufacturers.81  
The Court reasoned that New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action 
created a manufacturer duty to comply with an impossible state safety 
standard under federal law.82  The dissenting opinions asserted no such af-
firmative duty and instead reasoned that a manufacturer could comply with 
state law by paying damages even if it took no action to comply with the 
heightened state safety standard.83 
The Court adopted a process of elimination approach to find impossi-
bility preemption.84  Specifically, the Court reasoned that New Hampshire 
common law created an affirmative duty for manufacturers to ensure that 
their products were not “unreasonably dangerous,”85 then determined that 
every option available to comply with that duty was prohibited by federal 
law.86  New Hampshire applies a risk-utility balancing test to identify un-
reasonably dangerous products.87  The test does not technically include set 
factors; the Court, however, applied the three factors that the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court has repeatedly used: (1) “the usefulness and desirabil-
ity of the product,” (2) whether the product’s risks can be reduced without 
affecting its cost or effectiveness, and (3) the “efficacy of a warning to 
avoid . . . unreasonable . . . harm from hidden dangers or foreseeable us-
es.”88  The Court reasoned that sulindac’s usefulness and risk profile could 
only be improved by changing the drug’s chemical composition.89  Su-
lindac’s composition, however, could not be altered under federal law.90  
                                                          
these lawsuits.  We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt 
[plaintiffs] . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 79.  Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013). 
 80.  PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572; see also supra notes 70–72, 78 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the PLIVA holding). 
 81.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477. 
 82.  Id. at 2473–77.  The Court derives the state safety standard, that manufacturers must not 
sell unreasonably dangerous products, from the assessment of liability.  Id. at 2474. 
 83.  Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 2488, 2491 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting) (dichotomizing duties and incentives). 
 84.  Id. at 2473–78 (majority opinion). 
 85.  Id. at 2473–74 (noting that New Hampshire has adopted the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A). 
 86.  See id. at 2473–78. 
 87.  Id. at 2474. 
 88.  See id. at 2474–75 (quoting Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 
1182 (N.H. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 2475; see also supra Part II.A (summarizing FDCA regulations).  The Court also 
concluded sulindac’s simple, single ingredient, composition was chemically incapable of redesign.  
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475. 
  
2015] MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL v. BARTLETT 91 
Since improving the first two factors was legally impossible, the Court con-
cluded that Mutual Pharmaceutical’s only remaining option was to 
strengthen sulindac’s labeling.91  Relying on PLIVA, the Court then found 
strengthening the labeling similarly impossible.92  Therefore, the Court held 
that New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action was “without effect” 
under the Supremacy Clause because every available avenue to comply 
with the common law duty was prohibited under federal law.93 
The Court rejected the lower courts’ “‘stop-selling’ rationale” because 
of its destructive consequences on preemption jurisprudence.94  The Court 
noted that if exiting the market undermined a claim of impossibility, impos-
sibility preemption would be rendered meaningless; ceasing to act would be 
available in every previous case in which the Court found a “direct conflict” 
between federal and state laws.95  As an example, the majority cited PLIVA 
as squarely at odds with the “stop-selling rationale.”96 
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor contended that, properly applied, 
preemption principles posed no barrier to recovery.97  Justice Sotomayor 
advanced a literal reading of impossibility preemption, defining impossibil-
ity as two “irreconcilable affirmative requirements” imposed by state and 
federal laws.98  She contended that New Hampshire’s design defect cause of 
action “does not require that the manufacturer take any specific action.”99  
Instead, she reasoned that New Hampshire common law liability only per-
mits or incentivizes compliance.100  Justice Sotomayor explained that, unlike 
a legal mandate, exposure to liability does not leave a party no choice but to 
comply.101  Applying this distinction, Justice Sotomayor distinguished 
PLIVA on the grounds that the Minnesota and Louisiana law in PLIVA “un-
disputed[ly]” mandated stronger labeling102 whereas New Hampshire’s law 
only exposed Mutual Pharmaceutical to liability.103 
                                                          
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 2476. 
 93.  Id. at 2476–77 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 94.  Id. at 2477–78. 
 95.  Id. at 2477. 
 96.  Id. at 2478 (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–78 (2011)).  
 97.  Id. at 2483–84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 98.  Id. at 2485, 2488 (emphasis added). 
 99.  Id. at 2488.  
 100.  Id. at 2485–86.  Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that an incentive may still implicate 
express preemption, field preemption, or pose an obstacle to a federal objective.  Id.  She further 
qualified that “common-law duties may qualify as ‘requirements,’” but asserted that no such “du-
ty” was created by the text of New Hampshire’s law.  Id. at 2489 n.5.   
 101.  Id. at 2488. 
 102.  Id. at 2489 (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 103.  Id.  Justice Sotomayor also authored the dissent in PLIVA where she contended generic 
manufacturers could avoid impossibility by petitioning the FDA.  PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2587–88. 
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Justice Sotomayor contended that the majority wrongly assumed that 
manufacturers must have an option to avoid liability other than exiting the 
market or paying compensation as a cost of doing business.104  States, she 
argued, have the right to ensure compensation for their citizens, and federal 
law does not grant a manufacturer an absolute right to continue marketing 
pharmaceuticals free from liability.105  Justice Sotomayor added that tort li-
ability serves important functions, including assisting the FDA with drug 
safety106 and “perform[ing] an important remedial role in compensating” 
victims.107  After rejecting literal impossibility preemption, Justice So-
tomayor considered and dismissed federal objective preemption.108 
In reaction, the majority distinguished between strict and absolute lia-
bility, reasoning that strict liability “signals a breach of duty” whereas abso-
lute liability “merely serves to spread risk.”109  The majority, relying on 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,110 noted that “most common-law causes of action 
for . . . strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather to impose 
affirmative duties.”111  Consonant with Riegel, the majority asserted that 
New Hampshire’s products liability jurisprudence had consistently held that 
a manufacturer bears a “duty to design [its] product reasonably safely for 
the uses which [it] can foresee.”112  Furthermore, the Court noted that the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court had cautioned “that the term ‘unreasonably 
dangerous’ should not be interpreted so broadly as to impose absolute lia-
bility on manufacturers.”113  The Court emphasized that in New Hampshire 
“liability without negligence is not liability without fault.”114 
                                                          
 104.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2489, 2491, 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 105.  Id. at 2491 (noting an exception if the law poses an obstacle to a federal objective). 
 106.   Id. at 2485.  The FDA alone is incapable of detecting adverse events with low incidence 
and long latency; state tort law provides an incentive.  Id. at 2284–85.  Furthermore, tort suits 
“‘serv[e] as a catalyst’ to identify previously unknown drug dangers.”  Id. at 2485 (quoting Bates 
v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005)).  
 107.  Id. (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002)). 
 108.  Id. at 2493–94.  Consistent with Justice Sotomayor, Justice Breyer’s dissent also adopts a 
literal reading of impossibility preemption.  Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer 
lends greater weight to federal objective preemption, but, like Justice Sotomayor, rejects it is as 
inapplicable in Bartlett.  Id. at 2481–82. 
 109.  Id. at 2473 (majority opinion) (asserting that the respondent conflates strict liability and 
absolute liability). 
 110.  552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 111.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (reasoning that medical device causes of action in Riegel 
imposed requirements preempted by federal law). 
 112.  Id. at 2473 (quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847 (N.H. 1978)).  
Thibault explicitly rejected the notion of strict liability as “a tool of social engineering” and con-
cluded that “[u]nlike workmen’s compensation . . . strict liability is not a no-fault system of com-
pensation.”  Thibault, 395 A.2d at 845–46. 
 113.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330, 333 (N.H. 1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114.  Id. (quoting Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett was correctly decided given New 
Hampshire’s negligence-based strict products liability, but invited over-
expansive preemption of distinguishable state tort-law schemes with its em-
phatic rejection of Justice Sotomayor’s Calabresian law and economic poli-
cy.115  Rather than tailor its holding to New Hampshire, the Court safe-
guarded deterrence-centric policy goals by rejecting compensatory 
considerations as a form of absolute liability.116  The Court erred in both its 
mischaracterization of compensation and its implicit failure to recognize 
states’ right to experiment with fault under modern principles of federal-
ism.117 
While the extension of PLIVA adds little doctrinally to the Court’s ju-
risprudence, the discussion of law and economic tort policy unveils a deep 
divide over the supremacy of fault.118  Four dissenting justices would have 
imposed liability regardless of Mutual Pharmaceutical’s inability to take 
preventive action.119  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would 
reject fault entirely and rebuild tort liability from a Calabresian tabula ra-
sa.120  Though not adopted, and certainly inconsistent with fault, Justice So-
tomayor’s Calabresian policies legitimize states’ decisions to preserve tradi-
tional, “stricter” products liability.121 
The Bartlett Court’s conclusion that manufacturers must have an ave-
nue to escape strict liability has led to expansive preemption of distinguish-
able strict liability schemes.122  Rather than evaluate specific conflicts with 
state common-law duties, the lower courts have interpreted Bartlett to re-
quire preemption whenever a pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot increase 
product safety under federal law.123  This approach effectively rejects the 
                                                          
 115.  See infra Part IV.A.  Justice Sotomayor was a student of Professor Calabresi and a fellow 
judge on the Second Circuit for ten years.  Jo Becker & Adam Liptak, Sotomayor’s Blunt Style 
Raises Issue of Temperament, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/us/politics/29judge.html?pagewanted=all; Sheryl Gay Stol-
berg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.html?pagewanted=all. 
 116.  See infra Part IV.A.   
 117.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 118.  Cf. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 749 (“[T]here is prima facie inefficiency in the fault sys-
tem.  That is, if the fault system worked, one would never find fault liability.”). 
 119.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480, 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting with Kagan, J., joining); id. at 
2482, 2486 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting with Ginsburg, J., joining). 
 120.  See infra Part IV.B.  Law and economics, as a field, originated in the seminal work of 
Judge Guido Calabresi—The Cost of Accidents—in which Calabresi used economics to theorize a 
system of tort liability to reduce the cost of accidents more efficiently than fault.  CALABRESI, su-
pra note 7, at 26; Calabresi, supra note 12, at 748; Hylton, supra note 13, at 85. 
 121.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 122.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 123.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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“stricter” liability still assessed by a minority of states and mandates a neg-
ligence-based approach to strict products liability.124 
In the wake of Bartlett and PLIVA, the FDA proposed a rule to bring 
generic pharmaceutical liability into parity with branded manufacturers.125  
The rule would extend the CBE exception to allow generic manufacturers to 
unilaterally change warning labeling.126  The rule represents an express re-
versal of the FDA’s amicus position in PLIVA.127  Nevertheless, the FDA 
position, if finalized, will likely be granted deference and have a lasting ef-
fect on the generic pharmaceutical industry.128  If precedent is any indica-
tion, once the impossible conflict with state law is removed, a majority of 
the Court will be unable to coalesce behind an alternate theory of preemp-
tion.129 
Part IV.A discusses the Court’s rejection of Calabresian absolute lia-
bility.  Part IV.B assesses the viability of Justice Sotomayor’s compensato-
ry tort policy, legitimizing competing tort schemes preempted post-Bartlett.  
Part IV.C examines the negative impact of Bartlett’s over-expansive pro-
fault reasoning originating with the preemption of Maryland’s consumer 
expectations approach and extending to similarly situated jurisdictions.  
Part IV.D outlines the FDA’s attempt to reverse PLIVA and Bartlett and 
predicts the likely impact if its rule is finalized. 
A.  The Bartlett Court’s Negligence-Based Tort Policy Proves 
Dispositive in New Hampshire but Should Not Extend to States 
That Maintain “Stricter” Products Liability 
The Court should have limited its inquiry to the inconsistency between 
the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” and New Hampshire law.130  In-
stead, in response to Justice Sotomayor’s argument for compensation, the 
Court rejected compensatory policy as absolute liability and narrowly con-
strued strict products liability through a negligence-based conception of 
fault.131  The resulting mischaracterization of strict and absolute liability en-
                                                          
 124.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 125.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 129.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 130.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74, 2477–78 (2013) (discussing 
the inconsistencies). 
 131.  See, e.g., id. at 2470, 2477 (reasoning that the stop-selling rationale would render impos-
sibility preemption a “dead letter”); see also OWEN, supra note 2, at 245 (discussing the overlap 
between modern strict liability and negligence). 
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couraged over-simplistic, categorical preemption of “stricter”132 liability 
state regimes.133 
1.  The Bartlett Court Should Have Limited Its Reasoning to New 
Hampshire’s Negligence-Based, Majority Approach to Strict 
Products Liability 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court expressly rejected interpretations 
of its design-defect cause of action that impose absolute liability or liability 
without fault.134  Instead, New Hampshire adopted a negligence-based risk-
utility balancing test that assesses design defects in the context of reasona-
ble manufacturer conduct.135  As the Bartlett Court correctly held, in New 
Hampshire, if no reasonable conduct is available to a manufacturer, the 
product is not defective and the manufacturer is not liable.136  The Court 
should have stopped here. 
2.  The Court Instead Advanced Deterrence-Centric Tort Policy 
That Over-Expansively Rejected Competing Compensatory 
Considerations 
In order to rebut the policy arguments of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, 
the Court diverged from the concerns of New Hampshire and adopted pro-
deterrence law-and-economic policy incompatible with compensatory con-
siderations.137  The Court dismissed Justice Sotomayor’s attempt to balance 
compensation and deterrence, and instead rejected any compensatory pur-
pose behind strict products liability.138  Compensatory considerations, per 
                                                          
 132.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (analyzing liability on a spectrum with “strict-
er” as the metric of comparison). 
 133.  See, e.g., Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting 
Maryland’s consumer expectations approach to strict products liability); Fullington v. PLIVA, 
Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (preempting Ar-
kansas’s consumer expectations approach following Drager). 
 134.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 (citing Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330, 333 (N.H. 1997)) 
(“cautioning ‘that the term “unreasonably dangerous” should not be interpreted so broadly as to 
impose absolute liability on manufacturers or make them insurers of their products’”); id. (citing 
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (“We limit the application of 
strict tort liability in this jurisdiction by continuing to emphasize that liability without negligence 
is not liability without fault.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 135.  Id. at 2475.  The test also weighs the product’s usefulness and desirability to society; 
however usefulness was not in dispute in Bartlett.  See id. (outlining test). 
 136.  See id. at 2475–77. 
 137.  See id. at 2473–80 (rejecting compensation as absolute liability, mandating an independ-
ent manufacturer capability to escape liability, deriding the stop-selling rationale, and interpreting 
liability as preemptible affirmative requirements); see also supra notes 7, 13 and accompanying 
text(discussing the conflicting functions of tort liability). 
 138.  Compare Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (distinguishing breach of strict liability duties from 
absolute liability compensatory risk-spreading), with id. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“New 
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the Court, are either the result of absolute liability, which is universally re-
jected,139 or serve only to promote private deterrence.140  Any risk-spreading 
that results from strict liability the Court rejected as inefficient.141 
The Court further limited strict products liability by foreclosing the 
possibility of a duty to compensate.142  Under the Court’s deterrence-centric 
tort policy, a duty to compensate is untenable; manufacturers must have an 
avenue to “escape liability.”143  Otherwise, a manufacturer is found at fault 
for doing no wrong and is counter-productively deterred to an inefficient 
end.144  For this reason, the same majority Court in both PLIVA and Bartlett 
engrafted an independent action requirement onto the preemption inquiry: 
to hold a tortfeasor liable, it must be capable of unilateral preventative ac-
tion.145  Given the Court’s alternating treatment of “tort-as-compensation” 
and “tort-as-regulation,” its explicit rejection of tort law’s compensatory 
function is incorrectly expansive.146 
                                                          
Hampshire’s law, which mandates compensation only for ‘defective’ products, serves both com-
pensatory and regulatory purposes.”). 
 139.  Id. at 2473–74 (majority opinion); see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 
supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases rejecting absolute liability). 
 140.  See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (concluding that Bartlett’s private action serves a 
regulatory, not compensatory, purpose); see also POSNER, supra note 13, at 244 (reasoning that if 
the sole function of compensation is deterrence, compensation serves no purpose when there is 
nothing to deter).  The Court’s deterrence-centric policy dictates that the only reason plaintiffs 
receive the deterrence-payment is to incentivize private enforcement.  See POSNER, supra note 13, 
at 244. 
 141.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (rejecting risk-spreading as a purpose of strict liabil-
ity).  Risk spreading is more efficiently achieved in the private insurance market with lower ad-
ministrative costs.  See POSNER, supra note 13, at 254 (discussing administrative costs). 
 142.  Cf. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477–78 (rejecting the stop-selling rationale as rendering im-
possibility preemption meaningless because every conflict could be resolved in if the tortfeasor 
ceased acting).  Similarly, a duty to compensate would resolve every conflict.  But see Part IV.C 
detailing the warranty-based origins of strict products liability that provided quasi-contractual re-
muneration. 
 143.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 144.  Cf. POSNER, supra note 13, at 244 (discussing the inefficiencies of overcompensation and 
thereby over-deterrence).  Deterrence for conduct outside of a company’s control can create con-
tradictory incentives that induce the company to engage in more socially costly alternatives.  Cf. 
id. (discussing overcompensation). 
 145.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (discussing the manufacturer’s inability to take preventa-
tive action); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011) (citing to Wyeth for a unilat-
eral action requirement).  The Wyeth Court, however, established that available unilateral action 
was one means to defeat impossibility preemption, not the only means.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 568–73 (2009). 
 146.  See Sharkey, supra note 7, at 460–71 (discussing the Supreme Court’s alternating treat-
ment of tort-as-regulation and tort-as-compensation); compare PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–78, 
2580–81 (preempting state failure to warn claims as conflicting regulatory requirements), with 
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571–72 (finding no conflict between state and federal regulatory require-
ments). 
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3.  The Court’s Erroneous Distinction Between Strict and Absolute 
Liability Reduces State Autonomy and Invites Over-Simplistic 
Preemption 
While harmless in negligence-based New Hampshire, the Court’s di-
chotomous construction of negligence-based “strict” liability and jurisdic-
tionally verboten absolute liability overlooked the traditionally “stricter” li-
ability middle ground, and thereby instigated preemption of valid, albeit 
minority, state tort schemes.147  Strict liability, unlike absolute liability, 
does not transform manufacturers into insurers for their products.148  Under 
an absolute liability regime, manufacturers can be liable even if nothing is 
wrong with their product.149  Strict products liability, however, is limited to 
unreasonably dangerous, defective products.150  If a court finds a product 
unreasonably dangerous, then by definition the product has something 
wrong with it and the court is not imposing absolute liability.151 
The Court employs an absolute liability straw man to erroneously re-
ject compensatory arguments and preserve a fault-based tort liability sys-
tem.  The Court’s reasoning is syllogistic: (1) all jurisdictions reject abso-
lute liability;152 (2) Justice Sotomayor’s compensatory concerns would 
impose absolute liability;153 (3) therefore, all jurisdictions reject compensa-
tory concerns.  The error lies in the second premise; the Court mischaracter-
izes all liability without conventional fault as absolute liability.154 
                                                          
 147.  See infra note 160 (discussing federalism); see also infra Part IV.C (listing states that 
define unreasonably dangerous design defects in terms other than manufacturer conduct). 
 148.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57, 288; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 
supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases to support that “[t]he doctrine of strict liability has never 
meant absolute liability”).   
 149.  See OWEN, supra note 2, at 257, 257 n.108 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability by 
explaining “something must be wrong with a product before a court will hold a seller responsible” 
under strict liability).  Whereas strict liability creates a heightened duty, absolute liability effec-
tively eliminates the duty and breach elements altogether. 
 150.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, su-
pra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases to identify limitations on strict liability). 
 151.  See OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability).  “Defec-
tive” was added to § 402A to prevent an overbroad interpretation of “unreasonably dangerous” 
that assessed absolute liability when an inherently dangerous product performed as designed.  38 
A.L.I. PROC. 87–89 (1961). 
 152.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013) (rejecting absolute liabil-
ity); AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases). 
 153.  Compare Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473–74, 2474 n.1 (finding absolute liability to not im-
pose affirmative duties), with id. at 2479 (concluding that dissent would ignore common-law du-
ties). 
 154.  See id. at 2473–74, 2474 n.1 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability based on the ab-
sence of fault). But see supra text accompanying note 151 (inferring fault when something is 
wrong with the product).  The Court does not explicitly use the term “fault” in its definition of 
absolute liability.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473.  The subsequent reasoning, however, makes clear 
that the imposition of legal duties is synonymous with fault.  Compare id. (“an ‘absolute-liability 
regime’ . . . does not reflect the breach of any duties”), with id. at 2474 (“We limit the application 
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The Court acknowledges states’ freedom to adopt the liability regime 
of their choosing: be it absolute liability, strict liability, or any “stricter” li-
ability there between.155  In practice, however, the Court fails to account for 
the historically “stricter” variations.156  Strict products liability originated 
from the law of warranty in which liability was “‘strict’ because it [was] 
based not on a supplier’s fault . . . but on the frustration of consumer expec-
tations of product safety.” 157   While possibly closer to absolute liability 
than its modern fault-based counterparts, this consumer expectations ap-
proach remains distinct.158 
The Court’s sharp, aspirational dichotomy, however, implicitly sug-
gests that any regime short of imposing “true absolute liability” creates a 
preemptible duty sounding in negligence-based strict liability.159  By gener-
alizing, as opposed to limiting its ruling to New Hampshire’s majority, risk-
utility, approach, the Court in effect legislated the only tenable law for de-
sign-defect claims: one that is preempted by FDA regulations.  The Court’s 
expansive approach sounds the death knell for traditional strict products li-
ability in contravention of principles of federalism.160 
B.  Justice Sotomayor’s Law and Economic Tort Policy Supports the 
Traditional Compensatory Role of State Tort Liability in the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry 
Channeling the law and economic works of Judge Guido Calabresi, 
Justice Sotomayor raises legitimate compensatory policy concerns in oppo-
sition to the Bartlett Court’s over-expansive construction of fault.161  Justice 
                                                          
of strict tort liability . . . [by] emphasiz[ing] that liability without negligence is not liability with-
out fault.” (quoting Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 155.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (acknowledging the possibility of a “true absolute 
liability state-law system”); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (characterizing liability 
on a spectrum with the term “stricter” as the metric). 
 156.  See id. (“most common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do not ex-
ist merely to spread risk” (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24 (2008))). 
 157.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 245, 247.  Over the decades, however, fault crept back into 
“strict” liability as courts increasingly applied principles of foreseeability and risk-utility balanc-
ing, transforming “strict” products liability into a sobriquet for negligence.  Id. at 245.  
 158.  See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text (distinguishing liability for product de-
fects from absolute liability that applies regardless of something wrong with the product). 
 159.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (rejecting risk spreading as absolute liability). 
 160.  See supra text accompanying note 157 (discussing the origins of strict liability).  States’ 
ability to experiment is fundamental to the American system of justice.  POSNER, supra note 13, at 
893. 
 161.  E.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cautioning against “re-
mov[ing] all means of judicial recourse” (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 
251 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sharkey, supra note 7, at 466–71 (chron-
icling the Court’s pro-tort-as-compensation precedent and recognizing the “strong state interest in 
compensating victims”). 
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Sotomayor states that the function of pharmaceutical tort liability is to pro-
tect and compensate.162  This distinctly Calabresian approach is antithetical 
to a fault-based regime bound solely to the deterrence of wrongful con-
duct.163  Justice Sotomayor would instead loosen the requirements of fault, 
consistent with a “stricter,” more traditional, treatment of liability, to ensure 
compensation.164 
Justice Sotomayor does not advocate abandoning the primary deterrent 
role of tort liability.165  She necessarily, however, subordinates the Court’s 
concerns with counter-productive deterrence166 to secure compensation for 
plaintiffs.167  In addition to the considerations of justice,168 compensation 
serves two economic purposes: it internalizes product dangers into prices;169 
and diminishes the societal costs170 associated with “social and economic 
dislocations”171 arising from concentrated losses.172  Both economic “pur-
                                                          
 162.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“strict-liability regimes . . . 
serve[] both compensatory and regulatory purposes”); see also id. at 2484–85 (explaining that leg-
islative history indicates Congress meant to supplement the protection and compensation offered 
by state regulation and common-law liability).  Congress has preserved common-law liability for 
generic prescription drugs even while expressly preempting liability for medical devices.  Id. at 
2484, 2484 n.2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012)). 
 163.  CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 240–42 (characterizing fault as an oversimplified bilateral 
view of tort liability focused on the efficient division of costs to reduce the number of torts).  
 164.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2489 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose liability 
absent available preventative action); see also supra text accompanying note 157 (discussing tra-
ditionally “stricter” liability); infra Part IV.C (examining tort regimes clinging to “stricter” liabil-
ity standards).  Liability serves no deterrent purpose if the manufacturer has no available action to 
deter.  
 165.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As is typically true of strict-
liability regimes, New Hampshire’s law, which mandates compensation only for ‘defective’ prod-
ucts, serves both compensatory and regulatory purposes.”). 
 166.  See supra notes 140, 144 and accompanying text (discussing inefficient over-deterrence).   
 167.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491–92, 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose 
liability as a cost of doing business to secure a remedy for a seriously injured consumer). 
 168.  See id. at 2485 (describing tort liability’s “important remedial role”). 
 169.  POSNER, supra note 13, at 232 (“Strict liability in effect impounds information about 
product hazards into the price of the product, causing a substitution away from hazardous products 
by consumers who may be completely unaware of the hazards.”).  Efficient internalization, how-
ever, is limited to unknown dangers.  Id.  When consumers are cognizant of risks, they will pri-
vately insure.  Id.  As evidenced by Ms. Bartlett’s case, the consumer market for pharmaceuticals 
is characterized by unknown dangers and under-insurance; therefore economic policy dictates 
compensation.  See, e.g., Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 230–31 (D.N.H. 2011) 
aff’d, 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (suggesting Ms. Bartlett had no 
knowledge of the risks of sulindac). 
 170.  The societal costs are the economic waste that results from an ill-prepared individual be-
ing unable to bear the damages and becoming a drain on society.  Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 
42, 44–45 (detailing disruptive costs and economic dislocations arising from concentrated losses 
from accidents). 
 171.  Id. at 43–45 (referencing “the problem of poverty”).   
 172.  Cf. id. at 39–45 (framing an individual’s losses from an accident in terms of pain or utili-
ty).  But see Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s the Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 
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poses” are derived from the assumption that consumers will act rationally 
and efficiently if given sufficient information and resources.173 
Justice Sotomayor advocates transforming tort liability into a cost of 
doing business.174  This Calabresian Enterprise Liability approach allocates 
liability to the party best able to spread the otherwise concentrated losses 
(“lowest cost avoider”)175 and reduce administrative transfer costs.176  Sen-
sitive to the injustice of deterring “faultless” parties, Justice Sotomayor im-
plicitly adopts the proposition that “it is only fair that an industry should 
pay for the injuries it causes.” 177  Justice Sotomayor does not recommend a 
system in which no relation exists between the payer and the victim.178  In-
stead, she implicitly assigns lowest cost avoider status to the party “most 
likely to cause the burden”—generic pharmaceutical manufacturers—to 
diminish inadvertent deterrence.179  Enterprise liability is not naturally so 
constrained, and, in fact, the brand manufacturer may prove a more efficient 
candidate given its greater control over the product.180  Mutual Pharmaceu-
tical, however, could also serve as an efficient loss spreader by internalizing 
the cost of liability into prices.181 
                                                          
MD. L. REV. 12, 16 (2005) (criticizing the Costs of Accidents because loss of utility is not an eco-
nomic cost). 
 173.  See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 7, at 189–90 (using the availability of information to ex-
plain the impact of liability regimes).  With perfect information, producers will take cost-justified 
accident avoidance (precautions); similarly consumers will take care).  Id. 
 174.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 175.  CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 50–51, 143–44.  Concentrated losses refer to large economic 
costs accrued against one person over a short amount of time.  Id. at 39.  Economic waste and inef-
ficiency are reduced when losses are borne by parties able to pay, such as insurance companies.  
Cf. at 39, 50–51 (outlining the benefits to the individual). 
 176.  Id. at 50–51, 150.  Enterprise Liability is a common-sense approach that assigns liability 
to the enterprise that caused the harm.  Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961) [hereinafter “Calabresi, Some Thoughts”].  
 177.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning the manufacturer 
of an unreasonably dangerous drug should pay compensation); Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra 
note 176, at 500 (“[I]t is only fair that an industry should pay for the injuries it causes. . . . 
[L]osses should be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed on the basis of fault.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  In Bartlett, fault is contested, but causation is undisputed.  
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472. 
 178.  See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 22–23 (correcting the myth that there is a “necessary 
financial link between injurers and victims”); Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 176, at 514 
(“Proper resource allocation militates strongly against allocating to an enterprise costs not closely 
associated with it . . . .”).  
 179.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose manufac-
turer liability as a cost doing business); see also Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 176, at 505 
(“the loss should be placed on the party which is most likely to cause the burden”). 
 180.  See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–73 (2009) (discussing brand manufacturers 
ability to independently change labeling); see also CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 50–54 (describing 
Enterprise Liability). 
 181.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Sotomayor justifies allocating tort liability as a cost of doing 
business by differentiating statutory mandates from common-law liabil-
ity.182  She argues that, though the punishment may be identical, a manufac-
turer that violates a statutory mandate breaks the law; whereas a manufac-
turer that accrues liability has not broken any law.183  She reasons that this 
moral distinction translates into a material difference in social and legal ex-
pectations: statutory mandates are expected to evoke specific, compliant 
performance, whereas common law liability evokes only an amoral, eco-
nomic choice.184  This economic incentive model removes state tort liability 
from considerations of fault and immunizes common-law claims from fed-
eral preemption.185 
Justice Sotomayor’s departure from fault-based liability is particularly 
significant in light of the codification of negligence within “strict” products 
liability by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.186  While many jurisdictions 
have only selectively adopted the Restatement Third, a weakened version of 
strict products liability has largely pervaded the legal system.187  For those 
states concerned by the weakened compensatory function of tort law, Jus-
tice Sotomayor outlines a policy roadmap to justify reverting state “design-
defect” liability to its traditionally “stricter” origins.188 
C.  Post-Bartlett the Court’s Impossibility Preemption Reasoning Has 
Been Expansively Applied to Preempt “Stricter” Liability Tort 
Schemes 
In the wake of Bartlett, courts have engaged in large-scale preemption 
of state common-law claims against generic manufacturers.189  While many 
                                                          
 182.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing paying a 
fine from breaking the law). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id.  Justice Sotomayor compares this distinction to National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), where a condition that the triggers a tax does not 
equate to a “legal command” to take specific action.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 n.8. 
 185.  But see supra Part IV.A (characterizing the Bartlett Court’s reasoning as subjecting all 
common-law claims to potential preemption).  
 186.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts “largely 
dismantles” the traditional framework of Restatement Second § 402A and, as a result, many states 
have declined to adopt it.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 246. 
 187.  See supra note 2 (describing adoption of Restatement Third); see also infra note 202 
(chronicling the transition towards negligence-based liability). 
 188.  See supra notes 148–151, 154, 179 and accompanying text (contradicting the Court’s 
assertion that fault is the distinguishing factor between strict and absolute liability); see also infra 
notes 203, 204 (detailing the stricter origins of state common law).  
 189.  E.g., Johnson v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 2014) (preempting 
Louisiana law); Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharm., Inc., 751 F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 2014) (preempting 
Texas law); Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting Mar-
yland law); Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2013) (preempting 
Tennessee law); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013) (preempting Okla-
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of the preempted state claims were directly analogous to New Hampshire, 
some proved materially distinguishable.190  In one such case, Drager v. 
PLIVA USA, Inc.,191 the Fourth Circuit preempted Maryland’s consumer 
expectations test, interpreting Bartlett to preempt all state strict-liability 
claims.192  The court reasoned that regardless of the method used to calcu-
late an “unreasonably dangerous” design defect, Bartlett mandates that 
companies must have an avenue to escape liability and finds federal law 
eliminates all means for them to do so.193 
Both the Eighth Circuit and Pennsylvania initially protested the cate-
gorical application of preemption, absent state-specific analysis, but Drager 
has since become the dominant approach.194  The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Drager is problematic because the Bartlett Court mandate—that manu-
facturers must have an avenue to escape liability—is derived from New 
Hampshire’s risk-utility test, not the Restatement Second Section 402A in 
                                                          
homa law and noting “[i]t is for the state courts . . . to engage in the delicate policy considerations 
predicate to the expansion of the scope of state tort law”); Wagner v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 13-cv-497-
jdp, 2014 WL 3447476, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 11, 2014) (preempting Wisconsin law); Fullington 
v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) 
(preempting Arkansas law); Wilson v. Amneal Pharm., L.L.C., No. 1:13-CV-00333-CWD, 2013 
WL 6909930, at *14 (D. Idaho Dec. 31, 2013) (preempting Idaho law); Ko v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 
Inc., No. C-13-00890-RMW, 2013 WL 5692375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (preempting Cal-
ifornia law); Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-099-SA-JMV, 2013 WL 5423951, at *3 
(N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013) (preempting Mississippi law); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 965 
F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (preempting New York law).  
 190.  See, e.g., Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 746–47 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In contrast to 
New Hampshire’s risk-utility approach, Arkansas state courts focus on consumer expectations in 
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.  Consequently, it is not immediately 
clear whether Arkansas, unlike New Hampshire, offers generic drug manufacturers an opportuni-
ty, consistent with federal obligations, to somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous 
drug.  Therefore, we reverse the dismissal . . . and remand.” (citations omitted)); Neeley v. 
Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR, 2013 WL 3929059, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 
29, 2013) (“Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s analysis of defective design cases focuses 
on consumer expectations.  Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.” (citation omit-
ted)).  On remand from Fullington, the court followed Drager.  Fullington, 2014 WL 806149, at 
*3. 
 191.  741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014), 
 192.  Drager, 741 F.3d at 477–78. 
 193.  Id.; cf. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2493 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 
2475 for the proposition that a company must have an avenue to escape liability).  Another way of 
stating the Drager reasoning is that common-law claims create a manufacturer duty to take steps 
to lessen unreasonable danger, and that this duty is impossible to perform under Bartlett.  Drager, 
741 F.3d at 477–78.  The court in Drager also argued that a risk-utility approach would apply be-
cause the drug at issue malfunctioned and Maryland engages in a risk-utility inquiry for malfunc-
tioning products.  Id. at 478 n.2. 
 194.  Fullington, 720 F.3d at 746–47; Hassett v. Dafoe, 74 A.3d 202, 211–12, 217 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2013), appeal denied 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014) (table).  But see In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dro-
spirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2014 WL 
1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014) (following Drager); Fullington, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 
(“The Fourth Circuit is correct: whether a state follows the risk-utility approach or the consumer-
expectations approach does not affect the application of Bartlett.”) 
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general.195  Nothing in the Restatement Second forecloses a duty to com-
pensate. 
Necessary and insurmountable to the Bartlett holding is the bevy of 
New Hampshire common law that rejects any form of liability without 
fault.196  Consistent with this ideology, New Hampshire adopted a risk-
utility test that only imposes liability if reasonable preventative measures 
were available (duty) that were not taken (breach).197  Under this approach a 
product manufacturer “must have a way to ‘escape liability’”—preventative 
action must be available—or it cannot be found at fault.198  Fault, however, 
is a state construct subject to state discretion.199  If a state chooses to infer 
fault, or otherwise lessen the preconditions to find fault, the need for an 
“escape liability” requirement evaporates.200  Via the consumer expectations 
test, several states, Maryland included, have done just that.201 
The consumer expectations test pre-dates the risk-utility approach and 
is derived from the law of implied warranty rather than negligence-
balancing.202  The test harkens back to the original adoption of strict prod-
ucts liability when a manufacturer was “subject to liability to the . . . con-
sumer even though [it] . . . exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of the product.”203  Whereas a risk-utility test eliminates liability when 
a manufacturer exercises all possible care, a consumer expectations test 
                                                          
 195.  See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (deriving the escape liability requirement from a neg-
ligence-based, risk-utility duty to improve product safety with reasonable and available manufac-
turer conduct).  By the same token, the prohibition of the stop-selling rationale relied upon in 
Drager is dependent on a risk-utility, negligence-based approach. 
 196.  Id. at 2473–74. 
 197.  See id. at 2475–76 (reasoning that the risk-utility test is premised on manufacturers hav-
ing a duty to take reasonable preventative action). 
 198.  See id. at 2493–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2475 (majority opinion)) (dis-
cussing the “automatic conflict” because of a manufacturer’s inability to act). 
 199.  See supra notes 155–160 (discussing federalism and fault).  
 200.  See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability noting 
that strict liability “still signals a breach of duty”).  If this breach of duty is inferred, the manufac-
turer’s ability to escape liability is immaterial. 
 201.  See Dawn M. Goulet & Mark R. Miller, Show v. Ford and the Continued Role of the 
Consumer-Expectation Test in Illinois Product Liability Litigation, 15 TRIAL J. 47 n.6 (Winter 
2013) (collecting cases).  Drager is the primary authority for preemption of the consumer expecta-
tions test; other jurisdictions have merely followed suit.  E.g., Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 
1133, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 2014) (relying on Drager); Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 
JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (following Drager).  
 202.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 291–93.  The consumer expectations test was the dominant ap-
proach in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but the majority of courts transitioned to a risk-utility balancing 
approach because the consumer expectations test proved poorly adapted to cases involving obvi-
ous dangers, atypical victims, or complex product designs.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 293–99.  Un-
der the risk-utility test, a product is considered defective if the costs of prevention are less than the 
safety benefit.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 301.  This test is indistinguishable from negligence.  
OWEN, supra note 2, at 300–01.  
 203.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. a. (1965); see also OWEN, supra note 
2, at 256 (discussing § 402A). 
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does not assess a manufacturer’s exercise, non-exercise, or inability to exer-
cise any degree of care; manufacturer conduct, available or not, is not part 
of the inquiry.204 
Similarly, the Maryland consumer expectations test is concerned with 
protecting justified consumer expectations, not with ensuring that compa-
nies have an avenue to escape liability.205  “The relevant inquiry . . . focuses 
not on the conduct of the manufacturer but rather on the product itself.”206  
Under Maryland’s test, a defect, or breach of duty, is inferred whenever a 
product is deemed more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would con-
template.207  This inference distorts manufacturer duties and comparatively 
relaxes fault.208  This “stricter” liability, however, remains distinguishable 
from absolute liability.209  While Maryland’s test offers little guidance re-
garding the scope of manufacturer duties, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
discussed compensatory policy when adopting its strict liability approach.210 
                                                          
 204.  Compare OWEN, supra note 2, at 292 (discussing consumer expectations) with OWEN, 
supra note 2, at 303 (outlining liability under the risk-utility test).  The difference in scope be-
tween the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests is compensatory.  Rational actors only take 
precautions that are cheaper than the sanction.  John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theo-
ry, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 535.  Therefore, under either liability regime, manufacturers will stop taking 
precautions at the same, non-cost-effective point.  Id.  The only difference is liability beyond the 
cost-effective threshold.   
 205.  See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 350–53 363 A.2d 955, 962–63 
(1976) (adopting strict liability in Maryland to establish warranty-like liability without standard 
warranty defenses or proof requirements).   
 206.  Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958; see also Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 
F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Phipps clearly explains the fundamental difference between negli-
gence and strict liability in [the above quoted] terms.”). 
 207.  Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 368 Md. 186, 193–95, 792 A.2d 1145, 1150 (2002); 
Phipps, 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963 (“Proof of a defect in the product at the time it leaves the 
control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller sufficient to justify imposing liability for 
injuries caused by the product.  Where the seller supplies a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product, the seller or someone employed by him has been at fault in designing or constructing the 
product.”). 
 208.  Compare Halliday, 368 Md. at 195–96, 200–03, 792 A.2d at 1151, 1154–55 (explicating 
Maryland’s modern consumer expectations test at length without mentioning duties), with Mut. 
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2013) (explaining New Hampshire’s risk-utility 
test in terms of duties).  
 209.  See Phipps, 278 Md. at 351–52, 363 A.2d at 963 (“[T]he theory of strict liability is not a 
radical departure from traditional tort concepts.  Despite the use of the term ‘strict liability’ the 
seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting 
from the use of his product.” (emphasis added) (citing Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 
1967))).  Liability is only imposed when a product malfunctions. 
 210.  Phipps, 278 Md. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958 (“Various justifications for imposing strict lia-
bility in tort on manufacturers have been advanced by the courts.  It has been said that the cost of 
injuries caused by defective products should in equity be borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market . . . .  It has also been suggested that imposing strict liability on manufac-
turers for defective products is equitable because it shifts the risk of loss to those better able finan-
cially to bear the loss.  Another reason advanced is that a consumer relies upon the seller in ex-
pecting that a product is safe for the uses for which it has been marketed, and that this expectation 
is better fulfilled by the theory of strict liability than traditional negligence or warranty theories.  
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The court in Drager did not conduct any specific analysis of the Mary-
land consumer expectations test.211  The court instead relied on the Bartlett 
Court’s over-simplified reasoning that state law based on Restatement Sec-
ond Section 402A creates a manufacturer duty to reduce the unreasonably 
dangerous nature of its products; a duty frustrated by federal law regardless 
of the state’s definition of “unreasonably dangerous.”212  While the simplest 
approach is to treat all common law based upon the Restatement Second 
alike—and if the Restatement was a recent adoption, this approach would 
be reasonable—five decades of common law evolution in states with diver-
gent liability schemes suggests that a categorical approach is overly sim-
plistic.213  Whereas federal law invalidates New Hampshire’s finding of 
fault under its risk-utility approach, no conflict arises if Maryland infers 
fault under its consumer expectations test.  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s 
preemption of the Maryland consumer expectations test in Drager, while an 
accurate reflection of the Bartlett Court’s over-expansive reasoning, failed 
to account for states’ ability to alter the “duties” created by strict liability.  
The subsequent adoption of the Drager reasoning by other jurisdictions is 
similarly suspect.214 
The consumer expectations test has many distinct jurisdictional vari-
ants.215  Some jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid approach by inserting the 
                                                          
And still another reason advanced is that the requirement of proof of a defect rendering a product 
unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault on the part of the seller to impose liability 
without placing an often impossible burden on the plaintiff of proving specific acts of negligence.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 958 n.3 (referencing Guido Cala-
bresi, Some Thoughts supra note 176, at 499). 
 211.  Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 212.  Id. (“The Court in Bartlett did not determine that the New Hampshire law was preempted 
because it applied the risk-utility approach.  Instead, it concluded that there was no action that the 
defendant could take . . . to avoid strict liability.”).  The court’s interpretation of Bartlett is accu-
rate; its application, however, is unfortunate because it presumes that the Maryland consumer ex-
pectations approach only assesses liability if a company fails to take action.  No such conflict ex-
ists.   
 213.  E.g., Phipps, 278 Md. at 343–53, 363 A.2d at 958–63 (adopting Restatement Second 
strict liability nearly four decades ago).  Unlike other Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, impossi-
bility preemption does not lend itself to expansive application.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 
133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Impossibility pre-emption ‘is a de-
manding defense’ that requires the defendant to show an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between federal 
and state legal obligations.” (citation omitted)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589–90, 
593–94 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (distinguishing impossibility preemption 
from broader doctrines such as Congressional purposes and objectives preemption).   
 214.  See, e.g., Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 2014) (relying on 
Drager to preempt Missouri’s undefined, “collective intelligence” approach); In re Yasmin & Yaz 
(Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 
2014 WL 1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014) (relying on Drager to preempt Illinois’ Con-
sumer Expectation test); Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at 
*3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (adopting the reasoning of Drager to preempt Arkansas’ consumer 
expectations approach). 
 215.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 298, 485–86, 485 n.56, 489. 
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consumer expectations test into the risk-utility balancing test.216  Other 
states, however, have clung to a pure consumer expectations test either ex-
clusively or as an alternate to risk-utility.217  For those states with warranty-
based consumer expectations strict liability, courts should not presume 
Bartlett impossibility preemption.218  Instead, courts should engage in a 
state-specific analysis of the scope of fault, the nature of manufacturer 
common-law duties, and the legal necessity of an avenue to escape liability. 
D.  Responding to Expansive Bartlett Preemption, the FDA Proposed a 
Rule to Render Bartlett Moot and Reinstate Generic 
Pharmaceutical Products Liability 
On November 13, 2013, the FDA published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking that would amend its CBE regulation to bring ANDA (generic) 
manufacturers into parity with NDA (brand) manufacturers.219  If issued, 
the amendment would reinstate generic manufacturer strict products liabil-
ity by “eliminat[ing] the preemption of certain failure-to-warn claims” by 
PLIVA and Bartlett.220  The FDA specifically addressed the arbitrary dispar-
ity resulting from Wyeth and PLIVA, noting that liability turns upon a 
pharmacist’s whim.221  The cited purpose of the rule, however, is not ex-
pressly compensatory; rather, the rule is intended to rectify the disincentives 
created by preemption by “ensur[ing] that generic drug companies actively 
participate with FDA in ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and complete-
ness of drug safety labeling.”222 
                                                          
 216.  OWEN, supra note 2, at 297–98, 489, 489 nn.82–83; see also Goulet & Miller, supra note 
201, at 46 n.5 (collecting cases). 
 217.  See OWEN, supra note 2, at 293, 293 n.356, 485, 485 nn.56–57. 
 218.  Hassett v. Dafoe, 74 A.3d 202, 211-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), appeal denied 99 A.3d 926 
(Pa. 2014) (table) (“Absent from the vast majority of [Bartlett preemption] cases is the identifica-
tion of state law duties associated with various causes of action and a cogent analysis of how they 
conflict with federal law, which is the hallmark of an impossibility pre-emption determination.  
Furthermore, as the Bartlett Court’s analysis of New Hampshire law illustrates, pre-emption is-
sues are state-law specific.”).  Hassett held: “without a careful analysis of the applicable state law, 
pre-emption of all design defect claims is premature. . . . Thus, we agree with the trial court that 
blanket dismissal of all claims on pre-emption grounds . . . is unwarranted.”  Id. at 217. 
 219.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013).  In addition to chang-
ing the CBE provision of 21 C.F.R. 314.70(c)(6), the FDA proposed creating a corresponding ex-
ception under the misbranding provision of 21 C.F.R. 314.150(b)(10)(iii) to allow for temporary 
differences in labeling.  Id. at 67994. 
 220.  Id. at 67988–89. 
 221.  Id. at 67988 (“As a result of the decisions in Wyeth . . . and P[LIVA] . . . access to the 
courts is dependent on whether an individual is dispensed a brand name or generic drug.”). 
 222.  Id. at 67989.  Communication breakdowns are not a theoretical problem.  See, e.g., Huck 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Iowa 2014) (“Although required by federal regulations to 
mirror the brand defendant’s label, PLIVA did not update its metoclopramide packaging to in-
clude the new warning . . . .  The record is silent as to why PLIVA failed to add that warning.”).  
The FDA also intends the proposed rule to address the problem of orphaned ANDAs.  
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The FDA reopened the comment period in early 2015 after “an ex-
planatory statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continu-
ing Appropriations Act . . . supported . . . consider[ing] alternative solutions 
to the proposed rule.”223  As of this writing, the FDA estimates a final rule 
will issue in September 2015.224  In the previous comment period, just over 
one hundred comments were submitted, largely from the generic pharma-
ceutical industry.225  The main industry concerns include consumer confu-
sion arising from contradictory NDA and ANDA labeling and that generic 
manufacturers ill-equipped to unilaterally alter labeling.226 
If the rule goes into effect as proposed, generic pharmaceutical manu-
facturers will fall under the auspices of Wyeth unless Wyeth is over-
turned.227  Given the voting shift from Wyeth to PLIVA and Bartlett—the 
Wyeth dissent functionally became the PLIVA and Bartlett majority—
predicting Wyeth would be overturned is not without merit.228  The conflict 
                                                          
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological 
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67986, 67988.  The FDA notes: “[a]mong drugs for which a generic ver-
sion is available, approximately 94 percent are dispensed as a generic.”  Id. at 67988.  As such, 
brand manufacturers may discontinue marketing after generic entry, effectively orphaning related 
ANDAs.  Id.  Given this trend, the FDA notes that “it is time to provide ANDA holders with the 
means to update product labeling.”  Id.   
 223.  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-
logical Products; Public Meeting; Request for Comments; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80 
Fed. Reg. 8577, 8577–78 (February 11, 2015), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0081 (citing 160 CONG. 
REC. H9314 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (statement of Rep. Rogers)).   
 224.  FDA, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, REGULATIONS.GOV (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500 (outlining docket and time-
table). 
 225.  See id. (summarizing rulemaking docket). 
 226.  See FDA, Memorandum of Meeting with GPhA (September 8, 2014), REGULATIONS.GOV 
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0080 (de-
tailing concerns).  Disparate labeling for the same pharmaceutical, however, has existed for dec-
ades among drugs with multiple NDA versions.  See for example acetaminophen or ibuprofen.  
Furthermore, any confusion created by the rule would be temporary; CBE changes still require 
FDA approval, and, upon approval, all other application holders would be required to follow suit.  
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological 
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67992 (explaining the process via flow chart).  The FDA also proposed 
publishing all CBE-supplements on its labeling website.  Id. 
 227.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–73 (2009) (finding impossibility preemption 
inapplicable because under the CBE provision Wyeth could unilaterally change labeling); see also 
supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text (discussing Wyeth).   
 228.  Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Alito J., dissenting with Roberts, C.J, and Scalia, J. 
joining), with PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2571 (2011) (Thomas, J., delivering opinion 
with Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., and Alito, J., joining and Kennedy, J. joining in part) and Mut. 
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469–70 (2013) (Alito, J., delivering opinion with Rob-
erts, C.J., Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., joining).  The operative question is: if Wyeth 
was decided today, would it be decided differently?  The structural differences are not probative: 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan replaced Justices Stevens and Souter, respectively, in the dissents 
of PLIVA and Bartlett.  Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 556, 558 (Stevens J. delivering opinion with 
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preemption divide, however, as evidenced by the doctrinal shift between 
Wyeth and PLIVA, and then confirmed by Bartlett, suggests that a reversal 
of Wyeth is unlikely.229  Justice Alito’s Wyeth dissent advocated broad fed-
eral objective preemption based on the common-sense conflict between 
laymen juries declaring a drug unreasonably dangerous and FDA experts 
declaring it safe.230  In contrast, the majority in Bartlett does not mention 
federal objective preemption once.231  If Justice Alito, writing for the Court, 
had support for broader federal objective preemption, given his Wyeth dis-
sent, he would have at least addressed broader preemption in Bartlett, if not 
relied upon it entirely.  Justice Thomas, however, as expressed by his Wyeth 
concurrence, will not support federal objective preemption.232  Without the 
support of Justice Thomas, if the FDA’s proposed rule goes into effect, Wy-
eth will then govern the generic pharmaceutical industry, ensuring compen-
sation for individual litigants. 
If the FDA rulemaking fails, however, states should look to Justice So-
tomayor and Judge Calabresi for economic and equitable policy justifica-
tions to maintain states’ role in pharmaceutical oversight and to ensure 
compensation for their injured citizens.233  States should also consider the 
novel development of innovator (brand) liability advanced by judges in the 
aftermath of PLIVA and Bartlett to find NDA holders liable for injuries 
caused by their ANDA counterparts.234  Furthermore, legislatures should 
                                                          
Kennedy J., Souter J., Ginsberg J., and Breyer J. joining), with PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting with Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J. joining) and Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2480 (Breyer, J., dissenting with Kagan, J., joining) and id. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
with Ginsburg, J., joining).  The potential ideological change by Justices Thomas and Kennedy 
may, however, prove dispositive. 
 229.  Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 605, 609–12, 626 (Alito J., dissenting) (arguing based on 
federal objective preemption), with PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580–81 (deciding with impossibility 
preemption) and Bartlett 133 S. Ct. at 2476–77 (same); see also Sharkey, supra note 7, at 459, 
471–72 (reporting that the common thread running through the Supreme Court’s alternating 
treatment of tort-as-regulation and tort-as-compensation has been agency deference).  For example 
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–77 followed the FDA’s interpretation. 
 230.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 609, 626 (Alito J., dissenting); see also supra notes 68–69 and ac-
companying text (discussing Wyeth dissent). 
 231.  See generally Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466.  The only mention of federal objective preemp-
tion is by the dissents rebutting it as inapplicable.  See supra note 108 (outlining the dissents’ re-
jection of federal objective preemption). 
 232.  See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (characterizing implied 
preemption doctrines such as federal objective preemption as unconstitutional); see also supra 
note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Wyeth concurrence). 
 233.  See infra Part IV.B 
 234.  See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2014 WL 4055813, at *23 (Ala. Aug. 15, 
2014) (adopting “innovator liability” to hold brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers liable for 
injuries caused by bioequivalent generic pharmaceutical drugs); Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., No. 12 C 6403, 2014 WL 804458, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2014) (recognizing brand-
name liability for negligence even when a generic version caused the harm, but not for strict prod-
ucts liability); see also Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 414 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(Stranch, J., dissenting) (echoing the Fullington dissent in advocating brand manufacturer liability 
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consider compensatory economic policies in future lawmaking to diminish 
concentrated losses and efficiently reduce the societal cost of accidents. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court concluded 
that design-defect common law liability creates a preemptible duty in im-
possible conflict with federal generic pharmaceutical regulations.235  While 
correctly decided in New Hampshire, the Court’s reasoning discouraged 
“stricter” constructions of the duty236 and thus invited erroneous preemption 
of Maryland’s distinguishable calculation of design defect liability.237  The 
erroneous preemption in Maryland was then adopted in several similarly 
situated jurisdictions without significant state-specific analysis.238  As a re-
sult, for purposes of federal preemption, all state design-defect “strict” lia-
bility is treated as negligence.239  This treatment runs contrary to modern 
principles of federalism and disregards legitimate compensatory policy con-
cerns supporting traditional strict liability.240 
The Court’s expansive reasoning is best explained through the lens of 
law and economic tort policy.  Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, advanced 
compensatory policy that would transform design defect liability into a cost 
of doing business.241  The Court responded with classic pro-deterrence poli-
cy that analogized a compensatory duty to absolute liability and supported 
an expansive interpretation of FDA regulations.242 
The Court’s sweeping impossibility preemption triggered backlash 
from the FDA who proposed an amendment to its regulations to undermine 
the impossibility in PLIVA and Bartlett and reinstate generic pharmaceuti-
cal liability.243  Though the rulemaking could render Bartlett moot, analysis 
of the ideologies driving the Court’s decisionmaking remains instructive for 
predicting the Court’s ongoing tort-as-regulation treatment of products lia-
bility.244 
                                                          
for generic drugs.); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting) (positing brand manufacturer liability for generic drugs); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 
N.W.2d 353, 403 (Iowa 2014) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“[T]he universe of imaginable scenarios in 
which an actor who has not manufactured or sold a product may nevertheless both cause and be 
liable for damages caused is enormous.”).   
 235.  Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013). 
 236.  See supra Part IV.A; see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the duties created by “stricter” 
strict liability). 
 237.  See supra Part IV.C.  
 238.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 239.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 240.  See supra Part IV.A–C. 
 241.  See supra Part IV.B.  
 242.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 243.  See supra Part IV.D. 
 244.  See supra Parts IV.A–B. 
